


Incentives for evidence-informed management in public healthcare organisations





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#### health care goods = f(inputs)

surgery, check-up,...

nurses, beds, equipment,...

doctors,

technical **efficiency** cost efficiency (business performance)










#### health = $g[x_1, x_2, ..., x_n$ , health care goods = f(inputs)]













utility =  $h\{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n, health = g[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, health care goods = f(inputs)]\}$ 






utility =  $h\{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n, health = g[x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, health care goods = f(inputs)]\}$ 









# Evidence-based management of public healthcare organisations

# Two ways of achieving technical efficiency:

maximize outputs with given resources

#### or

• minimize resources for a given output


Which approach for public providers?

 $profit = \overline{revenues} - costs$ 





business performance through the lens of cost minimisation (not skimping on quality)





# Non-profits

Nature of health care goods and services

- Imperfect competition (monopoly etc.)
  - Public goods
  - Externalities
- Imperfect and asymmetric information (supplier induced demand etc.)

OUTPUT GOALS & PRICE SETTING according to normal average returns eliminating disequilibrium profits

#### +

#### Non-profit provision





- the non-distribution constraint which implies that no one has a legal claim on the non-profit's residual
- → either a tax incentive or legislative provision to encourage reinvestment in health care



# Evidence-based management of non-profits

Incentives for cost-minimisation in public non-profit organisations often facing soft budget constraints?

- Weak incentives for cost minimisation if no one has a legal claim on the non-profit's residual (even weaker under soft budget constraints)
- Financial (payment models) and non-financial supply side incentives









# Evidence-based management of non-profits

#### Fee-for-Service Payment

- providers with limited possibility to induce demand
  - output goals

#### Case-based Payment (e.g. DRGs)

 incentive to minimise costs for treatment of cases within a given case category

#### Capitation

- incentive to minimise costs
- incentive to engage in prevention

 $\downarrow$ 

Financial (payment models) and non-financial supply side incentives

→ constant fine-tuning

- designed according to the averagely efficient provider
  - $\rightarrow$  incentive for extra profits





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# Evidence-based management of non-profits

→ Meaningful information on performance and peer-to-peer comparison proven to lead to an intrinsic response much larger than profit incentives.

Financial (payment models) and non-financial supply side incentives









# Evidence-based management of non-profits

 $\rightarrow$  Governance of health care providers

→ Recognition and understanding of the role of supply-side incentives

→ Reorganisation of health care providers so that real decision-makers are incentivised

 $\rightarrow$  Hard budget constraints





Resolving the principal agent problems





## Some key lessons for Slovenia

- 1. A crucial role of adequate payment models designed according to the averagely efficient provider
- 2. Recognition and understanding of the role of supply-side incentives
- 3. Management under hard budget constraints
- 4. Reorganisation of providers so that financial and non-financial incentives can work  $\rightarrow$  incentivising actual decision-makers
- 5. Ongoing fine-tuning with the evaluation phase always in mind





